



# NETWORK SECURITY IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM



Director of Information Systems for Command,  
Control, Communications, and Computers


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


# CONSEQUENCES OF BEING VULNERABLE TO THE THREAT



Attack on Indian nuclear research facility identified as last coming from an Army Dental Command system

**Potential International Repercussions**



**Loss of Public Confidence**

e.g., apparent inability to protect publicly accessible web sites




Unprotected Backdoor into network

Intruder able to search files at will, control the Command's network, and potentially *control the Commander's C2*

**STOLEN PLANS & PROGRAMS**  
MSC Technology by Jenot  
SECRET Data Off Korean Server  
COE Waterway Data

**RESEARCH LABORATORIES**  
ARL & DREN at Risk



**Theft of Information, System Disruption/Denial**



**FINANCIAL DATA**  
\$1 Trillion in Cyberspace at any given time in a year<sup>2</sup>



# SCOPE OF THE CHALLENGE




FINANCE



CORPS OF ENGINEERS



TRANSPORTATION



WWW sites

ARMY CIRCUITS  
NON ARMY CIRCUITS  
ISP CONNECTIONS  
CONTRACTOR PT TO PTS  
DIAL-IN SYSTEMS  
FUNCTIONAL NETWORKS

E-Mail



SIDPERS



CPO



MEDICAL



INTRUDERS



# WHY NSIP ?




- **Mid-February '98**  
*Hackers attacked DoD Networks*  
*VCSA directs "fixes" at FLASH*  
*precedence*
- **DEPSECDEF Directs CINCs,**  
*Services, and Agencies to*  
*achieve "positive control"*  
*over their systems and networks*
- **Army leadership directed DISC4 IA**  
*Office to formulate plans to protect*  
*the Army's Critical Infrastructure*
- **Genesis of the Army:**

## The Network Security Improvement Program




### Army FY 99 Data

- 25M Security Events
- 2,069 Incidents
- 37 Intrusions






# WHAT IS NSIP ?





# ARMY IA TEAM



Tactics,  
Techniques,  
& Procedures

Army Signal Cmd

CECOM/ISEC

Army CERTs

Implementers

MACOMs/PEOs/PMs/Activities

Input from  
Leadership  
and  
Field

COUNCIL OF COLONELS



GOSC



VCSA  
(AS  
REQUIRED)



SENIOR IO REVIEW  
COUNCIL





# NSIP PHASE I ACCOMPLISHMENTS






# ACTUAL VIEW OF ARMY NETWORK ROUTER STATUS



DATA IS CURRENT TO WITHIN 5-15 MINUTES




**Monitoring network router  
status on a 24 X 7 response**

**Monitors US Army classified and  
unclassified network routers**




# IDS SECURITY ARCHITECTURE







# ACERT INFRASTRUCTURE



\* RCERT OPERATIONS/ACTIONS/REPORTING COORDINATED AND INTEGRATED WITH NOC OPERATIONS



# Information Assurance Vulnerability Alert



Simultaneous,  
Multiple Means to  
Multiple Levels

Multiple  
Methods of  
Event  
Notification

MACOMs'  
IA OFFICERS

MACOM GUIDANCE

ARFOR  
(ACERT)

Positive  
Control

Unit  
Action

CND-JTF

ARMY  
SENIOR  
LEADERSHIP

COMPLIANCE REPORTING

MACOMs'  
IA OFFICERS

IMPLEMENTATION  
CDR'S RISK ASSESSMENT

ALERT ACKNOWLEDGE  
ALERT DISSEMINATION

COMPLIANCE VERIFICATION



# PEO/PM IAVA RESPONSIBILITIES



## FIELDDED SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS:

- SYSTEMS MUST MEET STANDARDS DIRECTED VIA ARMY IAVA MESSAGES
- CONFIGURATION BASELINE MANAGEMENT RESPONSIBILITY MUST BE CLEAR
- MUST BE ABLE TO INCORPORATE SECURITY PATCHES DURING LIFE CYCLE
- WHO MAINTAINS BASELINE AND HOW ARE CHANGES VALIDATED, DISSEMINATED AND INSTALLED ?



## SYSTEMS IN DEVELOPMENT REQUIREMENTS:

- ENSURE DISSEMINATION OF IAVA REQUIREMENTS TO DEVELOPERS
- DO NOT FIELD IF SYSTEM IS NOT IAW NSIP STANDARDS










# BACK DOOR SITUATION

(Part I)



\*Internet Service Provider



# BACK DOOR SITUATION



**CAT I: Circuits that touch Army installations - more non-Army circuits than Army circuits**




**CAT II: Direct INTERNET Service Provider (ISP) connections provide connectivity outside the current purview of the DOIM or the Army**



**CAT V: Function specific networks have evolved to provide dedicated bandwidth in support of specific mission-critical functions with separate connections to the INTERNET or NIPRNET.**

**CAT III: Point to Point connections often connect Army installations with contractor facilities that may be connected to the INTERNET**



**CAT IV: Dial-up capabilities exist throughout the installation that do not use the enhanced I&A of authentication servers**





# CIRCUITS IMPACTING ARMY



**THERE ARE 110 ARMY PURCHASED CIRCUITS IN CONUS --  
108 CIRCUITS ARE PROTECTED WITH ARMY NSIP IDS  
SECURITY PACKAGE -- 98 %**



**THERE ARE 58 ARMY PURCHASED CIRCUITS OCONUS --  
55 CIRCUITS ARE PROTECTED -- 95 %**



**THERE ARE 136 NON ARMY CIRCUITS THAT CONNECT  
TO AN ARMY INSTALLATION IN CONUS**



**THERE ARE 166 NON ARMY CIRCUITS THAT CONNECT  
TO AN ARMY OCONUS INSTALLATION**



**THERE ARE ISP CONNECTIONS AND POINT TO POINT  
CONNECTIONS THAT ARE BEING RESEARCHED/IDENTIFIED**





# AUTHENTICATION OF LOGIN AND PASSWORD



**NETWORK SECURITY IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM (NSIP) -- ARMY  
MODEM DIAL-IN STANDARDS AND POLICY -- *DTG 231300Z APRIL 99***



## **MAIN POINTS:**

- migrate to an identification and authentication system that authenticates all dial-in operations with a unique user ID and password**
- JTA compliant with the Remote Authentication Dial-in User System (RADIUS)**
- RADIUS software configured for logging**
- authentication server monitored with a host based IDS**
- report type/location of authentication servers**
- remote configuration audit of authentication server**
- configuration of dial-in systems**



**ARMY organizations not having an authentication server capability MAY coordinate for use of the TSACS authentication servers**





# BIOMETRIC TECHNOLOGY



**FINGERPRINT RECOGNITION**



**VOICE RECOGNITION**




**IRIS**









# DNS DESIGN TOPOLOGY





# PROTECTED DNS





# PROTECTED DNS - TIER 0



DNS  
Camp Walker,  
Korea

DNS  
Ft. Shafter,  
Hawaii

DNS  
Mannheim,  
Germany

DNS  
Ft. Huacuhca,  
Arizona

DNS  
TACOM,  
Warren,  
Michigan

DNS  
Aberdeen  
Proving Ground  
Maryland



## Tier 0

- Receives/Responds to external queries
- Maintain anonymity of Army DNS system
  - Rewrite of name server record that indicates source of information
  - Rewrite of server records to prevent additional DNS information from being accessed

2800  
Data Dump  
Requests  
*Denied* -  
Foreign and  
Domestic



# PROTECTED DNS - TIER 1











## Tier 1

- IP Manager and DNS server integrated into 1 box
- Each tier 1 server contains all Army DNS information
- Resolves external DNS resolution for tier 0
- Functions as secondary to all tier 2 DNS servers within geographic area for internal queries
- Provides security management information to Network Operation Centers ( NOC)



# PROTECTED DNS - TIER 2




## Tier 2

- Primary point of installation DNS resolution
- Supports existing DNS services to include DHCP



# PROTECTED DNS - TIER 3



## Tier 3

- Provides access to WINS & other local services as required
- Required to meet configuration standards





# FIREWALL POLICY




✓ Firewall Message -- DTG 301200Z APRIL 99

✓ ITEMS DISCUSSED:

- Authorized firewall products
- Least privileged
- Coordination with supporting theater NOC and RCERT
- Perimeter/border versus critical server/enclave

✓ ADDITIONAL DISCUSSION:

- Architecture
- Implementation
- Configuration
- Testing





# SIPRNET

## CONCEPT OF OPERATION



- **Map** the SIPRNet on an installation
- **Use** scanner to discover network hosts and vulnerabilities
- **Research** existing policies and procedures
- **Evaluate** SIPRNet DNS solution
- **Evaluate** tactical interface
- **Develop** Army standard policies, procedures and hardware/software solutions.
- **Implement** Army standard policies, procedures and hardware/software solutions FY 2000.





# SIPRNET INITIATIVE



- The Theater Signal Command owns and operates the Army SIPRNet backbone in Europe and will conduct a pilot NSIP SIPRNet initiative:
- Apply Router Packet Filtering/Access Control Lists to SDN-SIPRNET perimeter routers -- **August 99.**
- Install and monitor 4 network IDS and 10 host based IDS -- **September 99.**
- Complete host based IDS fielding (estimated 80 servers) and expand ACLs to customer routers -- **December 99.**
- Implement Authentication Servers for dial-in and field remainder of network IDS (approximately 25) -- **March 00.**
- FOC for security-in-depth solution for the Army SIPRNet in Europe -- **September 00.**













# INSTALLATION INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE ARCHITECTURE (I3A)



## GUIDANCE



## ARCHITECTURE






# TRAINING



**NOTE: Figures are approximate numbers of personnel trained annually**








# POLICY

AR 25 - 1




ARMY  
PAM 25 - IA

ARMY  
REGULATION  
25 -IA



# INFORMATION INITIATIVE







# C2 PROTECT TOOLS



## TYPES OF TOOLS

- ToneLoc -Wardialer
- OPIE- 8 character password generator
- E-TKNEED -mapping/scanning tool
- E-SATAN -scanning tool
- Sentinel Detection Tool Kit (ARL developed IDS type scripts )
- TCP/IP Wrappers
- SPI TOOLS



## COTS PRODUCTS

- Real Secure
- ISS Scanner
- AXENT
- Anti-Virus (DoD licensed: Norton & McAfee)



## NEW TOOLS

- Army license for network/host IDS and firewall
- Modified “cracker” tool for UNIX and NT







# DoD DRAFT PKI POLICY HIGHLIGHTS



- All DoD components will deploy an infrastructure with the capability to issue Class 3 digital certificates by October 2000
- All DoD users will be issued a Class 3 certificate by October 2001
- All e-mail (as distinct from organizational messaging) will be digitally signed beginning October 2001
- DoD will replace Class 3 certificates with Class 4 certificates beginning June 2002



# DoD DRAFT PKI POLICY HIGHLIGHTS



**All private (non-public accessible) WEB servers containing DoD information will use Class 3 Certificate for server authentication and use Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) by June 2002**



**All WEB clients will require a Class 3 certificate for I&A to above servers by October 2001**



# DoD DRAFT PKI POLICY HIGHLIGHTS



## Two primary PKI efforts

- FORTEZZA-based PKI (near term solution for Class 4)
- Class 3 (formerly Medium Assurance) PKI

<i>Class</i>	<i>User Identification</i>	<i>User Token</i>	<i>Algorithms</i>
4 (High)	In person	Hardware (Smart card/FORTEZZA)	Type II
3 (Medium)	In person	Software	Type II



## DoD will issue two types of certificates

- Identify - for identification & authentication (I&A) and digital signature
- Encryption (e-mail) - for encryption only



# ARMY PKI POLICY HIGHLIGHTS



Army will comply with DoD PKI policy




Army will use DoD PKIs only






# SECURITY IN DEPTH FOR THE FDD





# EXTERNAL INTERFACE (REACHBACK) NETWORK SECURITY MECHANISMS



**Transportable Assemblage -- Perimeter Protection (TAPP)**

- one inline network encryptor
- one intrusion detection system
- one true firewall
- necessary for NIPRNET interface protection
- available for other interfaces



# TACTICAL INITIATIVE



- RCERT-EUROPE will validate the use of and integrate Tactical Assemblage Perimeter Packages (TAPP) into unit training and in support of real-world deployments.
- Test and implement with 7th Signal Brigade -- Theater Tactical Signal Brigade -- **December 99.**
- Test and implement with 7th Signal Brigade -- Corps Signal Brigade -- **December 99.**
- Prepared to deploy in support of real-world deployments -- **June 00.**





# CONCLUSION



Distance Learning

Y2K


ATM

Telemedicine

Power Projection

Sustaining Base

E-Commerce



GCCS-A

AFATDS

ABCS

FDD

WIN-T

FAADC2I

**The Future**

- Biometrics
- PKI
- Information Assurance Vulnerability Alert (IAVA)
- Compliance Verification

FBCB2

ISYSCON

8/9/99

**FULL DIMENSIONAL PROTECTION**